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ABSTRACT
In the current issue of JITTA, Ian Mitroff takes to task a certain breed of
technologists who champion a futuristic vision of humanity as cybernetic
organisms. These visionaries, Mitroff argues, need to "go back to school" in
order to gain a more sophisticated and sociologically-informed view of we
humans and how we know. One key thing that is missing in the thinking of these
technologists, Mitroff notes, is the recognition that mind is "'distributed' in
society." The current paper takes this theme as its point of departure. However,
in lieu of sending the excessively narrow technologist back to school, three books
are recommended as "bedtime reading." They include Edwin Hutchins'
Cognition in the Wild, Louis L. Bucciarelli's Designing Engineers, and Bruno
Latour's Aramis or the Love of Technology. A review of these works, which all
tell stories about the creation and/or use of technology, support Mitroff's point
that mind is social. Moreover, they show that mind is in fact socio-technical in
nature. Knowledge is seen to be embedded in our technologies and discourses, as
well as in our individual minds. What we can be said to know, in fact, arises in
complex interactions among and across these domains. These books,
accordingly, also shed light on the truly broad scope of our endeavor, when we
undertake the development of new technologies and systems. Moreover, in the
spirit of this special issue of JITTA, these books call our attention to the
centrality of language and dialogue in the creation of technology and the
knowledge that is associated with it.

INTRODUCTION
In the paper by Ian Mitroff in the
current issue (Mitroff 2001), the author takes
to task a certain breed of technologists whose

vision of one possible, and even desirable,
future involves the transformation of humans
into cyborgs. The basic idea behind this vision
is that the so-called "super-intelligence" of
computers can be joined directly and
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cybernetically to our own in order to vastly
enhance our capabilities. Indeed, we are told,
we must take this step in order to forestall an
alternative future in which we become
subordinate to a race of intelligent machines.
Mitroff's critique of the proponents of this
vision, then, turns on their "confusion over the
nature of intelligence." There are two key
aspects to Mitroff's argument. First, he notes
that one hallmark of human intelligence is that
people "think about thinking" – an
accomplishment
that
currently
seems
impossibly remote in the realm of artificial
intelligence. Second, the capabilities of an
individual human mind cannot reasonably be
grasped, and therefore simulated, without a
consideration of "all the other minds to which
it is connected and thereby inseparable." The
mind, indeed, is truly " 'distributed' in society"
and must be viewed as inherently social in
character. Mitroff concludes, then, that
computer scientists need to complete their
educations:
“Computer scientists, who are supposed to
[sic] hard-nosed and rigorous before they
accept anything, are actually quite sloppy
in their thinking. They literally need to "go
back to school" and to get a broader
education before they can accomplish their
aims. They need to understand what it is to
‘think about thinking with and through
others.’”

In this essay, I take as my point of
departure Mitroff's recommendation that
computer scientists "go back to school"; and I
make the assumption that his counsel can
readily be extended to certain other
technologists, including members of our own
information-systems community. I focus, in
particular, on Mitroff's second argument about
the distribution of mind in society – his point
about "thinking with and through others." I
will extend this point by arguing that
technologists sometimes misunderstand not
only the social nature of human intelligence or
mind, but also the relationship of mind to
technology. In short, mind in fact is best
viewed as socio-technical in nature.
Of course, for an established
technology professional or academic, literally
going back to school is an expensive

proposition. The tuition alone these days is
staggering. And then there's the opportunity
costs to consider – lost wages, neglected
friends, alienated children, broken marriages.
As an alternative, I will propose that the
technologist start more simply with a change
in bedtime reading. I will recommend three
books in particular that can provide a relatively
efficient, and diverting, introduction to the
richer and more sophisticated view of
intelligence that Mitroff demands. The books
are: Cognition in the Wild, by Edwin Hutchins
(1995); Designing Engineers, by Louis L.
Bucciarelli (1994); and Aramis or the Love of
Technology, by Bruno Latour (1996).
These books all involve case studies,
which is to say stories, hence my claim that
readers will find them diverting. And each
illuminates
somewhat
different,
yet
complementary, aspects of the relationship
between people, society, and technology. I will
review each of these books in turn, relative to
the topic at hand, and then conclude with a
discussion that ties the books together around
the concepts of language, discourse, and
knowledge. The focus on discourse will link
the current essay to the theme of this special
issue of JITTA on "the importance of dialogue
to the creation of and access to knowledge."

THREE RELATED QUESTIONS
In considering how these books speak
to the issue of "distributed mind" and the role
of technology, as well as to the technologist's
need for a wider view of these things, we will
entertain three basic questions (Figure 1).
First, how is knowledge distributed among the
participants in an existing work system? Here,
we will consider the category of "participants"
to include both the people and the technologies
that they use. Taking the technologies and
work system as a given, then, we can also ask
how people and, in particular, their knowledge
and associated commitments are shaped in the
context of work configured around those
technologies. To coin a phrase, we are asking
about their techno-socialization. Of the three
books, Hutchin's speaks most directly to this
first question. Accordingly, we will examine
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Figure 1: Three Related Questions
Question 1. How is knowledge
distributed among the people and
technologies in an existing work
system? And, how are people (and
especially what they know) given
shape in this context?
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Question 2. How are technologies
created by people in work systems
and how, more specifically, does
knowledge come to infuse those
technologies?
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Question 3. How does knowledge
come to be created and distributed
across both the people and the
technologies in a work system?
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his book first.1
This essay will then address the second
question. If technologies, as elements in work
systems, help to shape the people that come to
work with them, we can also ask, How do
people in work systems create the
technologies? We will see in particular what
Bucciarelli's book has to tell us about the
social construction of technological artifacts
and the embedding of knowledge in those
artifacts.
If our first question entertains the
shaping of people in a context given by
technology, and our second entertains the
shaping of technology in a context given by
people, then our third question brings the first
two questions together. We will ask, How is
the distribution of knowledge accomplished, in
the creation of technologically-based systems,
across both the technology in question and the
people who would use, or otherwise take
interest in, that technology? We will take
Latour's book on the forsaken Parisian
transportation system Aramis as the focus of
this discussion.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MIND AND
TECHNOLOGY-IN-USE
Edwin Hutchins' Cognition in the Wild
is a report on ethnographic fieldwork with a
navigation team aboard an amphibious
helicopter transport in the United States Navy.
It is, more specifically, a cognitive
ethnography, in that it considers the
functioning of navigational systems in light of
the thinking that is involved. However, his
analysis is not a simple, disaggregated
inventory of what the individual actors know.
Instead, his unit of analysis is the larger
"computational system" comprising the team
members and the technologies they use. His
account accordingly builds up from local task

1

Each of these books speaks in some way to all
three questions that will be entertained in this essay.
Moreover, each book has a great deal more to say
than I report here. Reading them is accordingly
recommended on many counts.

systems consisting of team members in
interaction with their navigational tools, to the
interlinked and interdependent activities that
produce the accomplishments of the larger
group. Learning on the part of individual
members is also examined, as is the
development of new knowledge, which occurs
as the larger system adapts to changes in its
environment. Hutchins' inferences about
cognition in this rich, practical context are
couched in detailed accounts of events and
performances that he observed while in the
field. His book concludes, then, with an
examination of the relationship between
culture and cognition, and a critique of the
individualized perspective of contemporary
cognitive science.
Navigation on something as large and
complex as a modern naval ship is a matter of
teamwork. Individuals with distinctive roles
and specialized (but overlapping) knowledge
work together to achieve a common goal, the
safe and efficient navigation of the ship. In this
respect, Hutchins is particularly interested in
the cognitive properties of the larger group
which, he argues, are "not predictable from…
the properties of the individuals" involved (p.
xiii). This is so because the group's cognitive
properties arise in the body of knowledge that
is required to coordinate the activities of its
members, a knowledge distinct from the
heterogeneous task-based knowledge that
those individuals possess (pp. 176-177). In this
view, "culturally constructed technical and
social systems… are simultaneously cognitive
systems in their own rights and contexts for the
cognition of the people who participate in
them" (p. 287).
Hutchins observes, moreover, that
cognition is ineluctably tied to the material
context in which it is practiced (p. xvi):
“… the environments of human thinking
are not 'natural' environments. They are
artificial through and through. Humans
create their cognitive powers by creating
the environments in which they exercise
those powers.”

The study of knowledge-in-practice,
then, must take into account the "sociomaterial environment of thinking" (p. 289). An
important component in that environment
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comprises the technologies in use. "Physical
artifacts,"
Hutchins
observes,
become
"repositories of knowledge" (p. 96). In the
practice of navigation, there are many such
repositories – the astrolabe, the alidade, the
hoey, the gyrocompass, the fathometer, the
nautical slide rule, to say nothing of the
innumerable charts and maps. It is in the very
design of these artifacts that the observations
and insights and decisions and calculations of
the predecessors of today's naval navigators
have become encoded or inscribed.
On the sea, then, in the hands of a
diverse team of contemporary navigators these
tools become the "representational media" (p.
96) that are used to understand the current state
of the ship and its immediate environment and
the likely effects of each upon the other. The
practice of navigation becomes, to a
substantial degree, an exercise in "distributed
interpretation formation" (p. 241) as "the
propagation of representational state" (p. 96)
helps the team to build a collective
understanding of the ship's situation over a
succession of interlinked tasks across the
team's members. Accordingly, even while
there is knowledge built into the technology, as
noted above, the technology also serves to
externalize certain cognitive processes of the
individuals for others to see (p. 236), as these
are brought together in a "cascade of rerepresentation" (Latour 1987, cited by
Hutchins, p. 132).
Such linked activities in representation
naturally raise the issue of communication, a
topic to which Hutchins gives considerable
attention. Representations crafted by means of
tools are embedded and passed along from
actor to actor in streams of language. Attention
to the properties of language – its potential, its
limitations, and the particular shape it takes in
the specific work context – is integral to
understanding "the computational properties of
the larger cognitive system" (p. 230).
Communication is important in daily
operations; but, of course, it also has a central
role in learning. Learning is a crucial function
of work systems because of the need to
continually replenish human expertise as the
human parts of the system turn over. Hutchins
recommends that learning "that happens inside
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an individual" therefore be seen as "adaptation
of structure in one part of a complex system to
organization in other parts" (p. 290).
Hutchins' account of the distribution of
knowledge (pp. 264-266) in navigational teams
provides a remarkably clear example of what
we recognize is true of essentially all work
systems, even if it may be less obvious at
times. And that's that the knowledge to run the
system, respond to new situations, and adapt to
changes is specialized and dispersed across
people and technological artifacts, which are
simultaneously integrated and coordinated to
work together toward common objectives.
Hutchins' ethnography, then, makes tangible
Mitroff's general observation about the
distribution of mind in society.
Before turning to our other bedtime
reading, it should be noted that Hutchins
comments directly on the fans of artificial
intelligence in a manner not unlike Mitroff. He
faults cognitive scientists (his target) for
attempting "to remake the person in the image
of the computer," and argues for a striking
shift in perspective (p. 363):
“The physical-symbol-system architecture
[of AI] is not a model of individual
cognition. It is a model of the operation of
a sociocultural system from which the
human actor has been removed.”

While Hutchins addresses change and
adaptation in the larger knowledge systems
that are the focus of his attention,2 he does not
give much attention to the fashioning of the
technologies that are components of these
systems. The other two books on our bedtime
reading list, however, do make this topic their
primary focus of attention. We consider
Bucciarelli's book next.

2

And in this regard he has a particularly interesting
discussion of the distinction between change by
evolution and change by conscious design. See pp.
345-351.
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one should be chosen. Technology defined
lies off somewhere in the future.”

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MIND AND THE
CREATION OF TECHNOLOGY

In
Designing
Engineers,
Louis
Bucciarelli describes and analyzes a set of case
studies with the aim of uncovering empirically
the nature of the engineering-design process.
Observing engineering on the ground in three
projects – an x-ray inspection system, a photoprint machine, and a photovoltaic energy
system – Bucciarelli takes us past the hard and
seemingly inevitable character of the
technological artifact to witness the social and
problematic process that produces the artifact.
He notes that we have been "schooled to see"
(p. 47) technology in a certain way, which he
characterizes as follows (p. 42):
“Technology, as it is commonly perceived
as machinery or a set of rules, is
something outside of us, out there. It draws
our attention to itself as a thing apart,
operating in rigidly determined ways,
repetitive, and usually nonnegotiable in
the human encounter.”

Based on his observations in the field,
he argues that real engineering-design process
challenges us with a starkly contrasting image
(pp. 20-21):
“… design is best seen as a social process
of negotiation and consensus, a consensus
somewhat awkwardly expressed in the
final product.”

In this context, the actual things which
such negotiations entertain are themselves far
from the hard objects that our everyday
notions of technology would take them for (p.
50):
“… while participants in all three
accounts talk about hardware – batteries,
photovoltaic arrays, control systems, Jtools, crystals, rollers, baffles – these
things are not so solid and well defined as
the word suggests. They are continually
referred to, brought into question,
explained, elaborated, even denigrated.
There is considerable uncertainty and
tentativeness about these things; the talk is
about how a photovoltaic array of this or
that size might work, how much it might
cost, when it might be delivered, which

And later on he remarks (p. 177):
“… even in a discussion about hard stuff –
technical
apparatus,
instrumental
operations, and inanimate things outside
of us – a healthy measure of ambiguity and
uncertainty makes room for designing… In
process, it is always possible to invalidate
yesterday's design move because the object
the language points to does not exist…
Only after the fact, when design yields to
artifact, do meanings appear firm and
consonant. The reality of the artifact, read
in retrospect, can lure you to think
otherwise, but that is a trompe l'oeil.3”

Echoing Hutchins' description of the
use of technologies in an existing work system,
Bucciarelli notes that "… no one participant…
has complete knowledge of the myriad of
events and exchanges that contribute to the
ongoing design process" (p. 33). It is, once
again, a case of teamwork involving the
heterogeneous knowledge of a diverse group
of actors. However, in contrast to Hutchins'
account, in which the actors have been shaped
(largely successfully) to their roles, here
"differing interests and viewpoints of different
parties to the design" help to produce
"incoherence and uncertainty" that demand the
active construction and maintenance of
"networks of things, people, and interests" if
the design effort is eventually to produce a
successful, tangible product (pp. 49-50).
The design process itself, then, is made
up of numerous "eddies of interaction" among
these actors, in which "bits and pieces" of
conversation add up, over time, to a design
discourse that gives shape to the technology.
Language is indeed central to understanding
how design unfolds in real practice.
Participants' contributions to the on-going
discussion are, in fact, "constructed
representations of purposeful things that [no
one] has seen" (p. 67). Participants " 'see' the
working artifact," which actually does not yet
exist, "through these representations" (p. 67).

3

Trompe l'oeil is a style of painting that gives an
illusion of photographic reality.
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These are scenarios, stories, which are
connected "to the furniture of the 'real' world
through [the participants'] past experience with
actual hardware and through discourse with
others, who have still other stories to tell and
contacts with yet others" (pp. 67-68). Thus,
"different
participants
with
different
perspectives and responsibilities in the design
process… will construct different stories
according to their responsibilities and
interests" (p. 71). This presents a situation in
which "although [the participants] work on the
same design, each sees the design in a way that
conforms to the structure and language of his
or her own object world" (p. 89) – where the
object world is "the domain of thought, action,
and artifact within which participants… move
and live when working on any specific aspect,
instrumental part, subsystem, or subfunction of
the whole" (p. 62).

true that anything goes in engineering design,
"but these are not determinate" (p. 159; also
see
Hutchins'
remarks
concerning
"computational constraints").

While stories told about aspects of
design take on the imagery and reasoning
appropriate to participants' diverse and
personal object worlds, these stories must be
brought into coherence. Participants must be
able to "communicate, negotiate, and
compromise; in short, … design" (p. 81). They
accomplish this by creating amongst
themselves "an accepted rhetoric for
describing,
proposing,
critiquing,
and
disposing that girds all design conversation,
fixing what constitutes a true and useful
account,"
and
establishing
a
tacit
understanding of "what is to be considered an
honorable claim, a significant conjecture, a
valid 'proof,' or a laughing matter" (p. 83).
Such rhetoric and tacit understanding are
neither given nor achieved effortlessly. Instead
they require active construction through the
concerted efforts of the participants
themselves. Their work on the building of their
community, the social milieu, for designing is
as vital and integral as their work on the design
of the artifact itself.

MAKING TECHNOLOGY, MAKING

The
technology
thus
emerges
necessarily within a social context of design–
in the same way that the meaning and purpose
of a technology that has actually been put to
work are necessarily defined, as Hutchins
documents, in a social context of use. This is
not to say that there is a lack of scientific or
technical constraints, in either case: It is not
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Bucciarelli's focus is on the fashioning,
in a social context, of the technology itself.
(Refer again to the second question in Figure
1.) Even as the technological artifact takes
shape, however, Bucciarelli does remark that
the artifact in turn "structures [the participants'
own] thoughts, beliefs, and practices" (p. 20).
Indeed, " … the object infiltrates thought"
even as " thought, reciprocally, configures the
object" (p. 70). As Hutchins' technologies-inuse, then, shape their users, Bucciarelli's
technologies-in-creation shape their creators.
This places us on the threshold of our third
question (again, see Figure 1) and our review
of Latour's book.

HUMANS

Latour's tale, in Aramis or the Love of
Technology, recounts the history of the illfated Parisian transportation system named
Aramis. Based on a vision of personal rapid
transit, Aramis was ultimately to have been a
system that could deliver passengers in
individually programmed cars without
intervening stops to their desired destinations.
Requisite traffic volume was to be achieved
through a highly innovative non-material
coupling, which would bring cars together in
trains without actually physically connecting
them. After many years under development,
spanning the period 1969 to 1987, Aramis was
ultimately abandoned. Latour's book asks why.
In a novel presentation that reads much like a
detective story (who killed Aramis?), Latour
weaves together a narrative around a dialog
between an engineering student and a
sociology professor that brings in interview
transcripts, official documents, and author
commentary; even Aramis is made to speak for
itself.
Do Latour's investigators ultimately
solve the mystery? The reader may judge for
him/herself. Our interest here is in how the
book, as an addition to the technologist's
bedtime reading, may serve to broaden further
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his/her view of technology and its relationship
to the distribution of knowledge in society.
We begin by considering, briefly, how
Latour's book fits in with the two we have
already considered. In Hutchins' story, we are
witness to a work system and its associated
assemblage of technologies that have reached a
point of relative stability.4 Navigational
practice and its technologies present a solid
and actively reproduced network of know-how
and commitments, firmly embedded in a wider
organizational context that provides stability
and clarity of purpose. By contrast, in Latour's
story we see a technological complex
struggling and failing to achieve such stability
and clarity – failing, ultimately, to get its
context to embrace it and cohere around it.
In Bucciarelli's stories, we hear about
engineers' efforts to embed their knowledge
into technological artifacts. (Like Aramis, not
all of these efforts are successful.) Along the
way, we learn about the plastic and
problematic nature of the artifact-in-becoming,
about its chimerical life in language. With his
focus on the artifact and its engineers, what we
do not see so clearly in Bucciarelli's tales is
that such an artifact is destined for a wider life,
where it will be given new, extended meaning
and even re-invented in the hands of its users
(Orlikowski 2000; Rogers 1995). Latour's
story, then, takes a step back and shows that a
technology may fail entirely to make the
transition from design into use – that it may
fail altogether to attain solidity and durability
as an artifact – if it does not successfully
engage and shape its broader context. Latour's
story, then, expands our vision of what it
means to "design" a technology, carrying us
beyond the shaping of the artifact into a
consideration of the "engineering" of the
minds with which the technology must engage.
In reflecting on the book itself, Latour
comments, in a manner quite like Mitroff's
"back to school" remark (p. x):

4

Stability is always relative, of course. It would be
interesting to learn about the state of naval
navigation now under GPS.

“I have sought to show technicians that
they cannot even conceive of a
technological object without taking into
account the mass of human beings with all
their passions and politics and pitiful
calculations, and that by becoming good
sociologists and good humanists they can
become better engineers and betterinformed decision makers.”

Latour brings language to the fore in a
way that picks up where Bucciarelli leaves off.
Echoing the latter when he says that "the
object the language points to does not exist,"
Latour points out that, "By definition, a
technological project is a fiction, since at the
outset it does not exist, and there is no way it
can exist yet because it is in the project phase"
(p. 23). If a technology-in-the-making is a
fiction, then engineers are novelists (p. 24):
“They invent a means of transportation
that does not exist, paper passengers,
opportunities that have to be created,
places to be designed (often from scratch),
component
industries,
technological
revolutions. They're novelists. With just
one difference: their project – which is at
first indistinguishable from a novel – will
gradually veer in one direction or another.
Either it will remain a project in the file
drawers (and its text is often less amusing
to read than that of a novel) or else it will
be transformed into an object.”

And thus in the ensuing pages, as the
investigators probe the death of Aramis, we
learn that Aramis (p. 24):
“was a text; it came close to becoming, it
nearly became, it might have become, an
object, an institution, a means of
transportation in Paris. In the archives, it
turns back into a text, a technological
fiction.”

But Latour takes us beyond a
consideration of the mere artifact itself: The
artifact, he argues, is a text that demands a
context, if it is eventually to become a fact, a
thing with weight and solidity in the real
world. "No technological project is
technological first and foremost" (p. 33).
Central to such a project is the fact that the
technology must be contextualized (p. 127):
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“The only thing a technological project
cannot do is implement itself without
placing itself in a broader context. If it
refuses to contextualize itself, it may
remain technologically perfect, but unreal.
Technological projects that remain purely
technological are like moralists: their
hands are clean, but they don't have
hands.”

The decisions to which Latour refers
get made, or do not, depending on how
interesting the crucial individuals find the
technology (p. 86):

Contextualization is, to a significant
degree, a matter of mobilizing the actors that
must become engaged in shaping the fate of
the technology (p. 126):

“The task of making Aramis interesting
never ends. For technology, there's no
such thing as inertia. Here's proof: even
an ordinary user can make Aramis less
real by refusing to get into one of its cars;
or, if she's a local official, by refusing to
get excited about it; or, if he's a mechanic
or a driver, by refusing to work for it.”

“The more a technological project
progresses, the more the role of
technology decreases, in relative terms:
such is the paradox of development. As a
project takes shape, there is an increase in
the number, quality, and stature – always
relative and changing – of the actors to be
mobilized.”

Reflecting back on Mitroff, the true
scale of the dispersion of "mind" becomes
more apparent than ever, now. Whether a
technology will come into being, survive, and
thrive depends on what a very great variety of
people know, believe, and assume to be true,
and on the commitments they make as a
consequence.

At the same time, the context in
question is not a given, so contextualization is
not simply a matter of designing the artifact to
fit a context – nor of finding an appropriate
context. "[T]he trajectory of a project depends
not on the context but on the people who do
the work of contextualizing" (p. 150). All
factors are thus in play, and demand the
intervention of the engineer. The engineer is
(p. 33):

This cannot be left to chance – this is
one of those aspects of the context that calls
for, as Latour puts it, heterogeneous
engineering. The engineer must accordingly
move from mere narrative, mere fiction, to
rhetoric. The engineer's text that is the
technology-in-discourse becomes a collection
of speech acts (Austin 1962) meant to shape
the world by shaping others' understanding and
action. His/her interpretations (pp. 194-195):

“a sociologist as well as a technician.
Let's say that he's a sociotechnician, and
that he relies on a particular form of
ingenuity, heterogeneous engineering,
which leads him to blend together major
social questions concerning the spirit of
the age or the century and 'properly'
technological questions in a single
discourse.”

“are performatives. They prove themselves
by transforming the world in conformity
with their perspective on the world. By
stabilizing their interpretation, the actors
end up creating a world-for-others that
strongly resembles an absolute world with
fixed reference points.”

In this light, Latour takes to task (p.
137):
“the idiocy of the notion of 'preestablished
context.' The people are missing; the work
of contextualization is missing. The context
is not the spirit of the times which would
penetrate all things equally. Every context
is composed of individuals who do or do
not decide to connect the fate of a project
with the fate of the small or large
ambitions they represent.”
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The need is obvious in the case of the
market, of the consumers – in this case, those
who must be persuaded to understand, believe
in, and therefore eventually ride, an Aramis.
"Consumer demand and consumer interest,"
Latour remarks (p. 187), "are negotiable like
everything else, and shaping them constitutes
an integral part of the project." It's important
not to overlook the importance of the term
"shaping," here. He makes it clear that the
consumer must not merely be convinced (p.
34) but, instead, substantially "invented" (p.
43).

Bedtime reading for technologists: elaborations on a theme of Mitroff's

The targets of persuasion are not
limited to consumers, however. Latour
considers the challenge confronted by one
Frèque, an actor on stage in the Aramis drama
(p. 172):
“Frèque attributes intentions to his CEO,
to the company head, to the RATP, to
nonmaterial couplings, and to variablereluctance motors, just as he attributes
rules of behavior to provincial cities, to
France, to the private sector, to the public
sector, and to humanity in general. He
lines up the actors, humans and
nonhumans alike, in a narrative; he
mobilizes them in a scenario in the course
of which Aramis exists for real on the
Petite Ceinture; he offers them roles,
feelings, and ways of playing. He creates a
whole world, a whole movie, a whole
opera.”

The difficulty for such a novelist, or
author, is to get beyond the merely rhetorical,
the mere act of "speaking for" (p. 42) these
various interests. Latour continues (p. 172):
“Will they follow along? Will they play
with him? If the actors lend themselves in
large numbers to what Frèque expects of
them, then his interpretation of their roles
as well as the Aramis object that they're
charged with creating will both be
realized.”

The rhetorical engineering of a context
for the technology, then, succeeds in greater or
lesser measure according to its ability to
convince others to become as they are
represented, to engender and translate
(Latour's term) their interests into coherence
with the envisioned form, and eventually with
the material fact, of the new technology.
Of course, as the details of Aramis'
history are revealed, we learn that there is no
single novelist attempting to author technology
and context into being. A great variety of
interests are engaged. And so the situation
becomes a matter of the interdefinition of
actors, implying that (p. 173) "Technological
projects are deployed in a variable-ontology
world," in which (p. 175):

other their theories of action, there's no
guarantee of their own continuity in time.”
People may "start mutating as the story
unfolds," leaving nothing "but the proper name
that allows us to spot them" (p. 177). The work
of
self-definition
accordingly
joins
interdefinition (p. 177), as actors struggle "to
stabilize a certain interpretation of what they
are and what they want" (p. 180). In short, the
system-building that's demanded in the effort
to innovate necessarily includes the shaping of
the actors around the opportunity presented by
the new technology, which in itself must be
shaped in the context of those actors and their
interests. (Refer again to the third illustration
in Figure 1.)
In system-building of this kind, the
system becomes saturated with intelligence, as
each element is shaped to and in-formed
(Boland 1987) by the role or part she/he/it has
to play.5 This is as true for the machines as for
the people, even if there is no "AI" per se
involved. But failure is entirely possible, as the
sad tale of Aramis relates. In the end, the
interdefinition of actors – human and material
– may be inadequate, incomplete. The
discourse that would "perform" the technology
to life may fall short in the kind of
argumentation, dialog, and negotiation that is
necessary to bring design into rapport with the
practical context of interests and actions, and
to impose itself in a way that ultimately
produces an everyday object – a transit system,
for example, that citizens ride to work – on
which people may now "have a simple point of
view" (p. 79).
To return to the technology in particular
and consider what Latour's story can teach
Mitroff's technologist (who by now may well
be suffering from insomnia!), we will close our
review of Latour by pondering these remarks
(p. 206):

5

“Actors never swim twice in the same
river. As they are defining one another, as they
are changing ontologies and offering each

"Humans and nonhumans take on form by
redistributing the competences and performances of
the multitude of actors that they hold on to and that
hold on to them" (Latour, 1996: 225).
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“Although charged by humanists with the
sin of being 'simply' efficient, 'purely'
functional, 'strictly' material, 'totally'
devoid of goals, mechanisms nevertheless
absorb our compromises, our desires, our
spirit, and our morality – and silence
them. “

And he concludes (pp. 212-213):
“We have been mistaken. Up to now, we
have believed in the existence of objects.
But there are no objects, except when
things go wrong and they die or rust. … If
the object were lying among nonhumans
alone, it would immediately become a bag
of parts, a heap of pins, a pile of silicon,
an old-fashioned object. Thus, the object,
the real thing, the thing that acts, exists
only provided that it holds humans and
nonhumans together… “

DISCUSSION: WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
"CYBORGS"
The bedtime reading I have just
described puts a great variety of technologies
before us. None are, in the everyday sense,
computer information systems, although
microprocessors are indeed found in some of
them. Nevertheless, readers of JITTA should
find much to recommend these books. As
system developers, and as teachers and
researchers in systems development, we are –
or we should be – heterogeneous engineers, as
Latour puts it. In making systems out of
hardware and networks and software, we
certainly create technological artifacts. But
when we are at our best, our work also helps
shape the wider context in which those
artifacts will be integrated and used. We are –
or again we should be – contextualizers.
Another thing these readings do for us
is to bring language into the foreground in our
thinking about our work with technologies and
their contexts. Hutchins reminds us of the
centrality of communication in the work
practices of our users; it is the glue that binds
together the knowledge and actions and
accomplishments of the disparate participants.
Bucciarelli and Latour reveal language at work
in the creation of technologies; more radically,
they show us that new technologies in their
earliest stages exist principally in the form of
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language. At the same time, a language-ofinnovation itself must be actively constructed,
if participants are to move forward
successfully. The consequences, as Bucciarelli
shows us, are anything but deterministic. The
seemingly inevitable artifact that appears afterthe-fact is revealed, in the light of history, to
be instead as much talk as substance, a
problematic site for the embedding of
decisions that are the result of a collectively
negotiated process of design that potentially
could produce any number of artifacts, or
possibly none at all. In line with the theme of
this special issue, we also witness the
indispensability of dialogue in the creation of
new technology, first in language and then
progressively in material form.
Latour, then, pans back to reveal the
wider role of language in contextualization.
Rhetoric, we learn, is indispensable in the
creation and alignment of interests around new
technology. Actors must deploy language in a
broader kind of system-building effort that
simultaneously gives form to the human and
institutional context even as it shapes the
technological artifact which, these actors
dream, will take its place within that context.
To the extent that we, in the field of
information systems, are like Mitroff's
computer scientists who should "go back to
school," these books help open our eyes both
to the true scope of our enterprise as
technologists and to the central role of
language in constructing and maintaining that
enterprise.
To return, then, to the theme of the
current essay, the third thing these books serve
to do for us is to sharpen our understanding of
the truly distributed, socio-technical character
of knowledge and intelligence. The stories in
question illustrate and amplify Mitroff's call
for transcending our over-individualized view
of mind. We see compellingly that the
knowledge required to accomplish a complex
purpose is necessarily differentiated and
distributed among a variety of human
participants. In developing and using
technologies and work systems, we depend
eternally on what our contemporaries know, as
they in turn depend on us. Moreover,
knowledge produced by people is extended in
time and space by virtue of its being built into
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our technological artifacts. The resulting
interdependence among people and machines
is pervasive. The artifacts remain inert – mere
curious, if potent, forms – without the users'
and their knowledge to complete them, in
some context of action. But the users' own
knowledge of the tasks at hand requires
completion by the knowledge that is designed
into, and defines the function of, those
artifacts.
As the human paleontologists have
observed, deep in our prehistory our hands,
brains, and tools made up a co-evolutionary
complex. We became human through our work
with tools. Tools, accordingly, are intrinsic to
our humanity. We have been extending our
discoveries, our decisions, our designs, our
minds, into artifacts for a very long time,
literally hundreds of thousands of years.
Consider a very old technology – the
stone hand-ax. Its contours reflect ancient
observations and judgments and choices. The
knowledge of how to make one and the
knowledge of how to use one were captured in
memory and reproduced both by practice and
by communication. When taken in a
sufficiently broad frame of reference, then, the
stone ax was already a "complex" technology.
Even while its design encoded the intelligence
of its makers, the stone ax did not "know"
enough, by itself, to accomplish meaningful
work. It needed a person, informed by the
appropriate culture, to complete it and give it
purpose – to make it truly an ax, and not just
an oddly shaped rock.
At the same time, the stone ax did not
provide a mere technological amplification of
its
user's
existing,
biologically-based
capabilities. When this tool arrived on the
scene and in our hands, it literally changed our
minds. We became, in that very instance,
"cyborgs."
It is an incidental and largely
uninteresting point that the stone ax was in our
hands and not physiologically embedded
within our skin. The stone ax was inside us in
a much more profound way: As it sat in our
hands, so too it simultaneously occupied our
minds. It changed how we think about our
capabilities, about how we might make a
living, how we might defend ourselves, how

we might express ourselves. It changed our
very concept of ourselves. Moreover, and this
was equally profound, it changed the nature of
our conversations. And if the paleontologists
are correct, it even helped to make language
and, hence, conversation possible.
To this day, we as humans continue to
accomplish such transformations on our minds
and our discourses through the medium of
technological innovation. Our knowledge, and
the learning through which we expand that
knowledge, is pervasive. It is a matter of what
we each know, as individuals; of what we
share with one another, encoded in and carried
by the on-going stream of discourse; and of
what we design into the artifacts through
which, and of which, we continually build and
rebuild our world. Moreover, as we learn from
the bedtime reading discussed here, it is about
what we share with one another as we create
and use our artifacts. In short, our knowledge
is to a significant degree built and propagated
and sustained in our discourses on technology.
Chips in our heads, if it ever comes to
that, will be small potatoes compared to the
profoundly
deep
and
complex
interdependencies between the knowledge that
is in people, the knowledge that is in
technology, and the knowledge that is in our
discourses.
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